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“Para ser grande, sê inteiro: nada 
Teu exagera ou exclui. 
 
Sê todo em cada coisa. Põe quanto és 
No mínimo que fazes. 
 
Assim em cada lago a lua toda 
Brilha, porque alta vive.” 
 
 Ricardo Reis in Odes, 1933 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... 7 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 8 
II. TAKEOVERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL AS 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ........................................................ 11 
III. SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE BOARD DURING A TAKEOVER .................... 13 
1. The Portuguese board neutrality rule 13 
2. Some defensive measures that can work as mechanisms for the protection of 
creditors 16 
3. Influence of the board 19 
IV. CREDITOR TYPOLOGY AND BARGAINING POWER ................................ 21 
V. CORPORATE CREDITORS AND THE TARGET COMPANY: RISKS BORNE 
IN THE EVENT OF A TAKEOVER ............................................................................ 22 
VI. THE INTERESTS OF CREDITORS IN THE LIGHT OF DIRECTORS’ 
DUTIES DURING A TAKEOVER ............................................................................... 25 
1. The Takeover Bids Directive 26 
2. The shareholder primacy view and the enlightened shareholder value 28 
3. The institutional view 29 
4. The stakeholder model 30 
5. Critical analysis 31 
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM ................................................ 33 
1. General legal provisions 33 
2. Reasons for creditors to rely on contracts 34 
3. Contracting around takeovers 35 
3.1. Change of control provisions 36 




3.2. Merger restrictions 37 
3.3. Agreements celebrated with controlling shareholders 38 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS .............................................................................. 38 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 41 
ELECTRONIC SOURCES ............................................................................................ 47 
CASE LAW .................................................................................................................... 52 
 
  






Art. – Article 
Arts. - Articles 
CIRE - Código da Insolvência e da Recuperação de Empresas, enacted by  Decree-Law nº 
53/2004, of 18.03.2004.   
CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (the Portguese Securities 
Market Commission) 
CVM - Código dos Valores Mobiliários, enacted by Decree-Law nº 486/99, of 
13.11.1999.  
CJSTJ- Colectânea de Jurisprudência- Acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça 
CSC - Código das Sociedades Comerciais, enacted by Decree-Law nº 282/86, of 2.10.1986. 
ff.- following 
Ed. – Edition or “Edição” 
EU- European Union 
ECJ – European Court of Justice 
LBO – Leveraged Buy-Out 
MBO - Management Buy-Out 
MS- Member-States 
p. – page 
pp. – pages 
RLJ – Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência 
ROA – Revista da Ordem dos Advogados 
Vol. - Volume 
  






1.1 Research Topic Outline  
The market for corporate control is assigned the important corporate governance 
role of addressing the conflicts of interest between the company constituencies, by 
rendering directors and managers accountable to shareholders and pursuing efficiency 
goals. As a result of the acceptance of hostile takeovers in European jurisdictions, 
Directive 2004/25/EC
1
 established a board neutrality rule that restricts the powers 
granted to board of directors
2
 when facing a takeover attempt- and, consequently, its 
ability to determine the outcome of the bid. The Portuguese legislator opted-in this rule, 
thus not granting the board much discretion to adopt defensive measures
3
: its main 
influence on the acceptance or rejection of the bid is exercised through a report on the 
conditions and opportunity of the offer
4
.  
The allocation of the decision on the success of the takeover to the shareholders 
leaves, however, some unsolved problems, as the exclusive consideration of shareholder 
interests may lead to the adoption of riskier strategies, to the detriment of other 
constituencies. Creditors can be affected by a takeover: as a result of such control 
transaction, the newly-owned company’s share value can drop, diminishing its asset 
base and rendering creditors’ claims and bonds less valuable. Additionally, creditors can 
stand to lose out on changes in the company’s strategy (especially in the company’s risk 
profile) implemented by the acquirer, which is why they may be interested in deterring 
the takeover. 
We will try to provide some contractual remedies which grant creditors some 
degree of control over the company and enable them to thwart an unwanted bid. 
                                                          
1
 EU Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover 
Bids (hereinafter “Directive” or “Takeover Bids Directive”). 
2
 In art. 278º of the Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies of 1986 (hereinafter quoted as “CSC”) 
three alternative models of managing and auditing  stock corporations are provided: a one-tier system, 
which only comprises a board of management (“Conselho de Administração”); the traditional two-tier 
system (arts. 390º and ff. CSC), with a board of management (“Conselho de Administração” ) and a board 
of auditing (“Conselho Fiscal”); and a three-tier system (arts. 424º and ff. CSC), with a board of directors 
(“Conselho de Adminstração Executivo” ), a supervisory board (“Conselho Geral e de Supervisão”) and a 
statutory auditor (“Revisor Oficial de Contas”). See ANTUNES (2009, 35-38). The obligation of 
neutrality bounds the members of the board of management, in the one-tier and two-tier systems, and the 
members of the board of directors and of the supervisory board in the three-tier system. During this study, 
we shall use the expressions “board of directors”, “board” and “management” to refer to either of those 
managing bodies, as our topic of research does not require a distinction between the three different 
systems. 
3
 See art. 182º of the Portuguese Code of the Securities Market of 1994 (hereinafter quoted as “CVM”).  
4
 See art. 181º CVM. 




Needless to say, the effectiveness of such solutions depends on the creditors’ ability to 
negotiate the introduction of restrictive covenants in the lending agreements celebrated 
with the corporate debtor. 
General company law rules, as well as insolvency and capital markets rules 
might grant creditors some protection - before or after a takeover. Nevertheless, we will 
only make a brief reference to such mechanisms, as the size limits applicable to this 
study require it to be concise. 
 
1.2 The Research Question 
The problem to which the present study is addressed is whether there is room for 
the consideration of creditor interests in the event of a takeover that can render directors 
accountable towards them. It will focus on the Portuguese approach to the problem of 
creditor protection in the event of takeover, although some references will be made to 
other legal systems.  
A vague reference is made by the Takeover Bids Directive to the consideration 
of the interests of other constituencies in such cases; in the Portuguese jurisdiction, art. 
64º CSC refers to non-shareholder interests that directors must take into account when 
managing the company. Nevertheless, most of the Portuguese and international 
literature seems to consider that during a takeover directors are only required to pursue 
the interest of the shareholders in maximizing the company’s share value,  which is why 
we considered this topic of interest. A change of control is one of the most important 
decisions for the company, affecting all of its constituencies including its creditors, who 
are some of the most important financers of the company. At the end of this survey it 
will be demonstrated that a stakehodler view of the company interests should be adopted 
during a takeover, and directors should be held liable for not exercising their influence 
on the outcome of the bid to protect creditors’ claims and rights.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Research Methods 
The starting point of our research was our interest on the topic of corporate 
governance in the market for corporate control, especially on what concerns the 
adoption of post-bid defensive measures by the target board. A preliminary research 
aimed at analysing the differences between takeover regulation in continental 
jurisdictions, such as Portugal, Belgium, France, Germany, and common law 




jurisdictions such as the U.K., and the U.S., namely on the interests that the board of 
directors is required to promote. Such research was conducted in September and 
October 2013, being that the conclusions were drawn on a Research Proposal.  The 
specification of the research question for this study helped us outline the topic of our 
research.   
The sources used for this dissertation consist on monographs, legal journal 
articles, working papers and studies, as well as online sources, from national and 
international authors. The comparative analysis of the solutions adopted by other 
jurisdictions for the protection of non-shareholder constituencies was an important part 
of the methodology used. The research also included consultation of national and 
European legal instruments, of national corporate governance codes of best practice and 
of existing case law from Portuguese courts and the ECJ. Another relevant contribution 
was an interview to Mr. Ward Möhlmann, from the European Commission DG Internal 
Market and Services, regarding the same topic. 
The reason for this study to be presented in English relates to the fact that most 
of the research was conducted at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven, during an 
Erasmus Internship Program, under the supervision of a professor from the same 
University.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
The present study will be structured as follows. Chapter II analyzes the 
phenomenon of the market for corporate control and possible motivations of takeovers, 
namely the ones which might harm the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. 
Chapter III will be dedicated to the Portuguese rules which establish specific duties for 
corporate directors during a takeover and will also describe some defensive measures 
that, if adopted by the target company, could benefit creditors. The adoption of the 
board neutrality rule might accentuate agency problems arising in the relationship 
between creditors and shareholders, as generally shareholders will only consider the 
price offered when accepting the bid, to the detriment of creditor interests. We shall 
return to the obligations of corporate directors in Chapter VI. Chapter IV explains the 
differences between two types of creditors: the ones which have the bargaining capacity 
to establish contractual remedies to protect their interests, and the ones who lack such 
capacity. This assertion is developed in Chapter V, which is devoted to the risks 




corporate creditors bear in the event of a takeover. The considerations developed in 
Chapters III and V will provide us the necessary background to turn finally to the crux 
of our study. The general duties that bind directors shall be approached in Chapter VI, 
which specifically focuses on the interests that the management must take into account 
when advising the shareholders on the bid. We conclude that although a stakeholder 
view should prevail, there is a tendency in Europe to adopt an enlightened shareholder 
approach during a takeover, which is why Chapter VII will try to provide some 
additional contractual remedies available to creditors and that might grant them the 
power to prevent an unwanted change of control. 
 
II. TAKEOVERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS 
 
To properly access the effects of takeovers in the position of corporate creditors, 
it is important to consider that hostile takeovers are considered “the most dramatic of all 
the corporate governance devices”
5
, and are crucial to mitigate conflicts of interest 
emerging between the diverse constituencies of publicly held corporations
6
. Relevant 
literature assigns the market for corporate control a corporate governance disciplining 
function as well as an efficiency function
7
. Such roles have different consequences 
according to companies’ ownership structures.  
Firstly, it is considered to be a key mechanism to render directors and managers 
accountable to shareholders, as takeovers can be executed with the purpose of removing 
an underperforming board. If the company’s shares are being traded below the fair value 
of the same assets
8
, it may become an acquisition target
9
; potential buyers will target 
poorly a performing firm and make an attempt to acquire the company, replacing the 
                                                          
5
 ARMOUR and SKEEL (2007, 1733). 
6
 According to art. 13º CVM, publicly held or open corporations (“sociedades abertas”), as opposed to 
privately held corporations (“sociedades fechadas”) are defined in general as stock corporations whose 
equity capital is open to public investment. They are ruled by the CSC rules applicable to stock 
corporations and by the relevant provisions of the CVM, which to some extent overlap with company 
law. See ANTUNES (2009, 11-12).  
7
 DAVIES, SCHUSTER and DE GHELCKE, Emilie, (2010, 12-19). 
8
 That is, the value the shares would have if the company was managed efficiently. 
9
 The expressions “target company” and “target” shall be used in this study to refer to the company which 
is likely to be taken over by a bidder. The board of such company shall be referred to as the “target 
board”. 




current board by another which will enhance its performance. Additionally, if directors 
and managers have reasons to suspect that a hostile bidder
10
 might take control if they 
run the company badly, such threat will ex ante induce them to minimize the costs and 
inefficiencies in order to maximize the company’s value. In the market-oriented 
takeover regulation, adopted in the U.K. and the U.S systems of corporate governance
11
, 
takeover regulation is centred on this idea
12
.  
The disciplining effect of takeovers is basically a remedy against shareholder 
apathy, which is why in Continental Europe, where more concentrated ownership 
structures prevail
13
, takeovers serve mainly efficiency goals- when the potential acquirer 
seeks to exploit synergies by combining the target company’s assets with the ones from 
another firm. The primary goal of takeover regulation in such jurisdictions is the 
protection of minority shareholders (by the prevision of exit rights
14
 and of a sharing 
rule for the control premium
15




                                                          
10
 The expressions “bidder” and “potential acquirer” shall be used as references to the investor who 
attempts to acquire the company by means of a takeover. 
11
 Terminology used by ARMOUR and SKEEL (2007, 1728). 
12
 In the U.S., defensive measures can be used if they are justified in accordance with the business 
judgment rule. However, this standard is only applicable if the directors prove that that there was a 
“reasonable threat to corporate policy and effectiveness” and that the measure adopted was a 
“proportionate response” (see cases Unocal and Unitrin of the Delaware courts). Most States have codes 
of laws which grant the board a significant discretion to use defensive tactics (see paragraph 23-2-35-1(d) 
of the Indiana Code on footnote 150). In the U.K., takeover regulation is driven by the preponderance of 
institutional investors, which explains why it is strongly oriented towards protecting the interests of 
shareholders and offering good investment protection (see Rule 21 of the Takeover Code). See ARMOUR 
and SKEEL (2007, 1735). 
13
 According to WYMEERSCH (2012, 2) the Takeover Bids Directive was conceived in a time when the 
dispersed ownership model was the company paradigm. 
14
 See art. 196º CVM. For a definition of the shareholders’ exit right, see BAPTISTA (2005, 84). 
15
 From the side of the sellers, by imposing a duty to share the control premium with the non-selling 
minority; and from the side of the potential acquirer, by imposing a duty to offer to buy the non-
controlling shares at the same price as that obtained by the controlling shareholders. See Art. 194º, n.º2 
and 197º CVM and DAVIES and HOPT (2009, 257-260). 
16
 Takeover regulation in European countries was harmonised by the EU Takeover Bids Directive. The 
Directive allows three major options for national legislators: adopting the board neutrality rule or the 
breakthrough rule, or both; refusing to adopt one of rules, or both of them, while allowing companies to 
spontaneously comply with such rules (opt back into the provisions
16
); adopting either of the rules, or 
both, but give the companies the power to escape those rules if the potential acquirer is not subject to the 
same restrictions (reciprocity exception).
 
Germany adopted the second option, thereby allowing the board 
to adopt defensive measures upon approval by the supervisory board, or upon a preliminary general 
authorization by the shareholders (Vorratsbeschüsse, in § 33, 1 (1) and (2) of the WpÜG).  Portugal (see 
the explanation in Chapter III, point 1) and France (see arts. L. 233-32 (I) and L. 233-33 of the French 
Code de commerce) have adopted the third option. See VASSOGNE, LOY and CARDI (2009, 299-302) 
and VENTORUZZO (2006, 32, 50-51, 66). 




However, these assumptions are not necessarily true due to high transaction 
costs, shareholders’ incomplete information and the pressure to tender
17
. Also, corporate 
control transactions are executed for a variety of reasons and while the two mentioned 
above tend to enhance social welfare, other motives are purely value-decreasing
18
. 
Bidders might be driven by empire-building purposes (self-interest), thus overpaying for 
a takeover which will imply the sole creation of value for the acquiring company’s 
shareholders or a higher compensation of its directors. Another tactic a corporate raider 
can use to generate large amounts money is to purchase enough shares in the target 
company to threaten a change of control, thereby forcing the company to buy its own 
shares back at a higher premium in order to suspend the takeover (the operation by 
which the company buys its own shares back constitutes an anti-takeover strategy 
known as the Greenmail or Goodbye Kiss
19
). Furthermore, stakeholders who are 
outsiders can stand to lose out on changes in the company’s strategy (especially on the 




III. SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE BOARD DURING A 
TAKEOVER 
 
1. The Portuguese board neutrality rule 21 
Like some European jurisdictions
22
, Portugal had established a no frustration 
rule before the implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive, which is why the 
changes introduced in our jurisdiction only concerned the adding of the reciprocity 
                                                          
17
 The European Commission has stated, in its Report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC, on 
takeover bids (2006,4), that although in theory takeovers promote economic efficiency, economic analysis 
shows that in practice such assumption is not necessarily true. See also the The Takeover Directive 
Assessment Report (2012, 278-279). 
18
 ARMOUR and SKEEL (2007, 1739). 
19
 SILVA (1996, 238). 
20
 Some examples of anti-takeover measures are provided in the next point. See pp. 14 and ff. 
21
 Some authors prefer to use the expression “non-frustration rule”, arguing that the board is prohibited 
from frustrating the takeover before the shareholders have had an opportunity to decide whether they 
would like to accept or reject the bid, rather than a merely neutral position. In fact, the board is allowed to 
seek other offers (white knight defence) and is required to elaborate a report expressing its opinion on the 
merits and conditions of the bid. See VAZ (2013, 177-179), LEITÃO (2007, 66) and CÂMARA (2011, 
“As Ofertas”, 185). Other authors adopt the expression “passivity rule”- See SILVA (2012, 783-800). 
22
 Namely, Spain, Italy, France, Austria and the U.K. See The Takeover Directive Assessment Report 
(2012, 65- 66). 






. The Portuguese legislator has established a general principle on the 
limitation of the powers of the target board during a takeover process
24
 (board neutrality 
rule)
25
 in art. 182º of CVM.  
The board neutrality rule implies that during the course of a bid, the board of 
directors of the target company must refrain from taking any actions that materially 
change the company’s net asset situation – namely, the issue of bonds and other 
securities that grant the right to their subscription or acquisition and the execution of 
agreements that aim to dispose of important parts of the corporate assets
26
 -, are not 
included in the company’s  day-to-day business
27
  and significantly affect the objectives 
announced by the bidder
28
.These three cumulative criteria apply from the moment that 
the target board becomes aware of the decision of the bidder to acquire the company
29
 
to the moment when the end results of the bid aw assessed of when the bid procedure 
ends, whichever occurs first
30
.  
The decision on whether to accept or reject the offer made by the bidder is 
consequently outside of the scope of the board of directors’ functions
31
. Art. 182º CVM 
                                                          
23
 Upon the implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive, Portugal added the reciprocity exception, 
which allows the board of national companies to build up defences against companies which are not 
subject to the board neutrality rule. The purpose of this exception is to establish a level playing field for 
Portuguese companies. See arts. 182º, n.º 6 CVM and art. 12º, n.º3 of the Takeover Bids Directive. 
24
 It should be noted, however, that the board neutrality rule only applies to takeover bids launched over 
more than one-third of the securities of the same category as those that are object of that bid. See art. 
182º, n.º1 CVM. 
25
 The board neutrality rule is established under art. 12º, n.º2 of the Takeover Bids Directive. SILVA, J., 
(2012, 799-800), criticizes this option, arguing that Portugal should adopt the board neutrality rule as a 
default rule, while giving Portuguese companies the option to derogate this rule by a modification of its 
articles of association.  This solution was adopted in Italy by Decreto Legislativo 25 Septembre 2009, 
n.146, Disposizioni integrative e correttive del decreto legislative 19 novembre 2007, n. 229, recante 





 Art. 182º, n.º2, b) CVM. 
27
 VAZ (2013, 225). 
28
 Art.182º, n.º2. This limitation of powers is extended to the directors’ actions carrying out decisions 
taken before the relevant period and that have not yet been partially or completely carried out. See art. 
182º, n.º2, c) CVM. 
29
 That is, when the target company receives the preliminary announcement of the bid. See art. 182º, n.º2, 
a) CVM. See CÂMARA (2011, Manual, 590, and 2011, “As Ofertas”, 185). 
30
 Art. 182º, n.º1 CVM. Some authors, such as ENRIQUES (2009, 22-27) criticize the option of EU 
policymakers on setting the board neutrality rule as a default rule. The same author argue the EU should 
adopt a neutral approach towards takeovers and help individual companies define their degree of control 
contestability, namely by requiring MS to establish in their national laws that companies can grant 
directors a veto power on takeover bids. KIRCHNER and PAINTER (2010, 45-51) propose a European 
modified business judgment rule which would allow the target board to adopt defensive measures that are 
linked to the “best interest of the company, and particularly its shareholders ”during a takeover attempt. 
The burden of proof should be on the side of the board, unless its actions are authorized by the 
shareholders. 
31
 See art. 405º, n.º1 CSC. 




ensures that the market for corporate control functions efficiently
32
 and allows 
shareholders to sell their shares and to exit the company should they consider the offer 
is wealth-enhancing - the addressees of the bid are the shareholders, which is why they 
are the ones who decide on the merits of the bid. The flip-side of the coin is, however, 
that the limitation of the powers of the board to build up defences for the company 
might lead to a lower premium to be offered to the shareholders in return of their shares.  
The incentive for companies to enter the market for corporate control (which is higher if 
they are allowed to shield themselves from changes of control), and the fact that 
Portuguese companies became more vulnerable to takeovers from companies which are 
not subject to the same limitations are other consequences
33
.  
There are, however exceptions to this rule, regarding actions that correspond to 
the fulfilment of obligations undertaken before the acknowledgement of the takeover 
bid and actions authorized by a resolution of a shareholders’ general meeting 
exclusively convened for that purpose
34
. The board does not need, however, an 
authorization of the shareholders’ general meeting to seek competing takeover bids 
(white knight defence)
35
 or to adopt the people pill. In the situation of a hostile takeover 
attempt, the expression white knight refers to a company or individual which will launch 
an alternative bid at a higher price
36
 with the purpose of preventing the hostile bidder 
from taking control of the target or to induce him to make another offer which is more 
favourable to the shareholders. The white knight will have the support of the 
management
37
. The white knight defence is allowed by art. 182º, nº3, c) of the CVM and 
by art. 9º, nº2 of the Takeover Bids Directive as an exception to the board neutrality 
                                                          
32
 See the OECDE Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, 19), where it is stated, in Principle II. E 
that “Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent 
manner”. It is clarified that “Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and the 
board from accountability”.  
33
 VAZ (2013, 140-14) and SILVA (2012, 799-800).  
34
 The general meeting is only empowered to legitimate the board for the practice of those acts if it is 
convened and held during the relevant period. The shareholders’ resolution can only be taken by the 
qualified majority required by arts. 383º, n.º2 and 386º, n.º3 of the CSC (corresponding to at least 2/3 of 
the votes expressed) for the modification of the company’s articles of association PINTO (2009, 630). 
35
 See art. 182º, n.º3, a), b) and c) CVM. Alternative bids are regulated in the CVM on arts. 185º, 185º-A 
and 185º-B. 
36
 According to art. 185º, n.º5 of CVM, the price of the offered by the white knight must be at least 2% 
higher than the one offered by the hostile bidder and cannot contain clauses which make it less 
favourable. 
37
 Nevertheless, the legal prohibition on financial assistance in the acquisition of its own shares is 
applicable to the target company, which is why the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (Comissão 
do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, hereinafter “CMVM”) has formally understood that the board cannot 
provide, even if only partially, financial assistance to any competing takeover bid. See Parecer Genérico 
da CMVM sobre os deveres de comportamento na pendência de Oferta Pública de Aquisição (OPA), I.2. 




rule, mainly because when the board seeks alternative bids it aims at getting a higher 
premium for shareholders in return of their shares. The people pill is another defence, 





2. Some defensive measures that can work as mechanisms for the 
protection of creditors 
The threat of a takeover to be launched over the company induces corporate 
directors and controlling shareholders to act in concert
39
 and create strategies (defensive 
measures) which aim at preventing a potential takeover attempt or at frustrating an 
existing one. Indirectly, such measures provide creditors who are not interested in the 
change of control over the company some protection.  
There are two possible motivations for the adoption of defensive measures: 
either the directors are only interested in keeping their jobs– management entrenchment 
hypothesis
40
- or they truly believe the price offered is not fair and that shareholders 
should get a higher price in return of their shares – shareholder interest hypothesis –.  In 
the first case, the board will adopt strategies that affect the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control and might lead to a decrease in the company’s share value
41
. In some 
cases, the controlling shareholder are also interested in keeping their position of control, 
which is why they will support the adoption of such measures (by approving them in a 
general meeting)
42
, and thus putting the interests of minority shareholders and other 
constituencies at stake. In the second case, the management will try to increase the share 
value of the firm (premium effect
43
) – either by seeking alternative offers (white knight 
defence), or by forcing the hostile bidder to offer a higher price through the adoption of 
                                                          
38
 Some authors, namely LEITÃO (2007, 64), argue that in most cases the potential acquirer will want to 
replace the management of the company, and thus will not be discouraged from completing the takeover 
if the board adopts this defence. 
39
 See Art. 2º, n.º1, d) of the Takeover Bids Directive for a definition of “persons acting in concert”. 
40
 VAZ (2013, 157). See also LEITÃO (2007, 64).  
41
 According to Recommendation I.6.1 of Código de Governo das Sociedades da CMVM (2010, 2), “In 
cases such as change of control or changes to the composition of the Board of Directors, defensive 
measures shall not be adopted that instigate an immediate and serious asset erosion in the company, and 
further disturb the free transmission of shares and voluntary performance assessment by the shareholders 
of the members of the Board of Directors.” (Translation used by the Sonae Capital Corporate Governance 
Report of 31.12.12).  
42
 Art. 182º, 3, b) of CVM. 
43
 The expression “premium” in the context of a takeover refers to the difference between the estimated 
market value of a target company’s shares and the actual price paid by the bidder in order to obtain the 
control over the company. VAZ (2013, 160). 








One can distinguish between two types of defensive measures
45
:  preventive –
adopted when there is no offer pending with the purpose of preventing future takeovers 
from happening (also referred to as pre-bid defences or shark repellents
46
) - and 
reactive defences (also named post-bid defences) – adopted after a takeover bid has 
been announced with the purpose of frustrating that specific takeover
47
. In the EU, most 
jurisdictions have adopted the board neutrality rule
48
, thus restricting the circumstances 
in which the board might adopt post-bid measures
49
. Such options clearly reflect the 
idea that although defensive measures might be considered a mechanism to negotiate 
the bid price, they may also operate to allow entrenchment of underperforming boards
50
. 
The adoption of post-bid defences is also restricted in Portugal, while pre-bid 
defences are generally allowed
51
. Special disclosure requirements apply to pre-bid 
defensive measures under art. 245º CVM
52
. Such disclosure requirements benefit 
stakeholders, such as future investors and corporate creditors
53
, as they allow them to 
evaluate if the company has build appropriate defences or, if, on the contrary, is likely 
to have a change of control
54
.  
In this chapter some examples of defensive measures which can work as 
mechanisms of protection for creditors shall be provided. These may lead in the 
frustration of the takeover, thus benefiting creditors who are likely to be affected by the 
control transaction. Strong creditors will be able to approve some defensive measures 
                                                          
44
 See pp. 20 and ff.  
45
 Terminology used by CORDEIRO (1994, 772 and ff) and VAZ (2013, 141 and ff.). For other defensive 
tactics classifications, see GUINÉ (2009, 23-27). 
46
 LEITÃO (2007, 61). 
47
 In the framework established by the Takeover Bids Directive, the board neutrality rule (art. 9º) refers to 
the adoption of reactive tactics, while the break-through rule (art. 11º) is applicable to two specific types 
of preventive measures - the restrictions on the transfer of securities and on voting rights. 
48
 See footnote 22. 
49
 Such option contrasts with the one adopted by the U.S., where the board is granted a significant role in 
the takeover process. 
50
 See DAVIES and HOPT (2009, 265). 
51
 Except when the breakthrough rule is applicable. See art. 11º of the Takeover Bids Directive and art. 
182º-A CVM. 
52
This article implemented the obligations established for MS under art. 10º of the Takeover Bids 
Directive. It was modified by D.L. n.º185/2009 of 12.08.09, which added other information duties, such 
as a declaration on the compliance with a corporate governance code or the reasons for non compliance 
(comply or explain approach regarding soft law) - See art. 245º-A, n.º1, n), o) and p). 
53
See OECDE Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, 21) Principle IV.D – “Where stakeholders 
participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and 
reliable information on a timely and regular basis.” 
54
 VAZ (2013, 164). 








i) Pre-bid defences56 
Voting caps, golden parachutes and poison pills are some examples of 




Restrictions on voting rights lead to disruptions on the principle of 
proportionality between capital and vote. Art. 384º, nº2, b) of the CSC states that the 
articles of association may establish that the votes issued by a single shareholder
58
 
which exceed a maximum number are not counted, regardless of the amount of its 
stockholding (voting caps). This strategy constitutes an exception to the principle of one 
share-one vote
59
 and grants some shareholders more power in the general meeting.  
The golden parachutes
60
  are clauses under the employment contract between 
the company and its directors or managers that specify a compensation if the 
employment is terminated, namely as a result of a merger or takeover (in such cases 
these clauses are named change-in-control benefits
61
, and they render the takeover more 
expensive to the bidder). Under Portuguese law the amount of the compensation must 
comply with the limits established by art. 403º, nº5 of CSC.   
Some preventive measures imply control over the company’s shares
62
. The 
typical example is the poison pill (also known as shareholder rights plan)
 63
,  which is a 
                                                          
55
 This possibility shall be explained in Chapter VII. 
56
 According to CORDEIRO (1994, 773 and ff.), four types of preventive defensive measures can be 
outlined:  organizational measures, restrictions on voting rights, financial schemes and control over 
shares. This classification was also approached by LEITÃO (2007, 61 and ff.). See also VAZ (2013, 144 
and ff).  
57
 Art. 182º-A CVM. 
58
 For the calculation of voting rights, see art. 20º CVM. 
59
 ANTUNES (2009, 31-32). See the limitation of art. 386º, n.º5 CSC.  
60
 Allowed under arts. 402º and 403º CSC, although art. 245º-A, n.º1, l) establishes the obligation for the 
company to disclose such agreements with the members of the board, in line with art. 10, n.º1, k) of the 
Takeover Bids Directive. 
61
 These benefits generally consist on severance payments, bonuses or stock options. See L’ITALIEN 
(2012). 
62
 Some preventive measures which imply such control are the Macaroni Defence (a company that is 
likely to become an acquisition target will issue a large number of bonds that must be redeemed at a 
higher premium in the event of a takeover) and the Lobster Trap (the firm’s articles of association contain 
a provision which prevents individuals with more than 10% ownership of convertible securities, namely 
convertible preferred stock and warrants, from transferring these securities to voting stock). See LEITÃO 
(2007, 64) and VAZ (2013, 147). 
63
 Under the French law, Article L 233-32 (II) of the French Code de commerce, allows the target 
company to adopt a poison pill (the “bons Breton”), as long a certain requirements are met. The 
shareholders may, in an extraordinary general meeting approve the issue and allocation to all shareholders 
of warrants carrying the right of subscription for shares of the company on preferential terms. This power 




tactic whereby the shareholders have the right to buy the target company’s shares at a 




ii) Post-bid defences 
Most post-bid defences which are likely to cause relevant changes in target 
company’s net asset situation and do not form part of the normal course of the 
company’s day-to-day business must be authorised by the shareholders’ meeting
65
 to be 
engaged in by the board. Some types of defences are the White Squire, the Pac-man 
defence and the Share buy-back
66
. In the White Squire defence, the target company will 
issue new shares or securities that grant the rights to their subscription or acquisition in 
order for them to be purchased by a friendly investor in an amount large enough to deter 
a hostile takeover attempt
67
.  In the Pac-man defence, the company threatened with a 
hostile takeover will attempt to acquire its would-be buyer
68
. In a Share Buy-Back, the 
target company will repurchase its own shares and consequently reduce the number of 
shares available in the market, with the purpose of either increasing the value of the 
remaining shares or of eliminating any threat of acquisition of a controlling stake in the 




3. Influence of the board 
As a consequence of the transposition of the Takeover Bids Directive, the 
director’s role when a takeover bid has already been made is an advisory one
70
. The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
can also be delegated on the board. It is generally considered that the issue of such warrants works as 
threat of dilution of the potential acquirer’s shares and voting rights in the company and is used to force 
the negotiation of the bid price. Nevertheless, it cannot be applied against a foreign bidder who is subject 
to the board neutrality rule and the breakthrough rule in his country. See FARDEU (2007). 
64
 The most known types of poison pills are the flip-in provision (a provision which gives the current 
shareholders of a company, other than the hostile bidder, rights to purchase additional shares in the same 
company at a price lower than their market value and the flip-over rights plan (the option of 
current shareholders of a firm to purchase shares from the bidder at a discount). See CORDEIRO (1994, 
775) and LEITÃO (2007, 63). 
65
 Art. 182º, n.º3, b) CVM. 
66
 Other measures could be mentioned. For a more extensive analysis, See VAZ (2013, 139 and ff. and 
216 and ff.), GUINÉ (2009, 29 and ff). 
67
 Under normal circumstances the board would have competence to decide on an increase in the 
company’s equity capital under art. 456º, n.º1 CSC.  
68
 VAZ (2013,149-150). 
69
 VAZ (2013, 153). However, one should bear in mind that art. 317º, n.º2 stipulates that a company 
cannot hold more than 10% of its equity capital. Also, art. 324º, n.º1, a) of CSC establishes that in a 
resolution regarding an increase of the share capital the voting rights of the shares owned by the company 
are suspended.  
70
 Some authors criticize this option. See footnote 30 on p. 14. 




limitation of the powers of the board during a takeover process does not prevent it, 
however, from exercising its influence on the shareholders’ decision to accept or reject 
the bidder’s proposal, through a report where it states the conditions of the bid and 
expresses its opinion on its merits and opportunity. This is the most important 
mechanism for the board to influence the outcome of the bid, as it can recommend the 
shareholders not to sell their shares.
71
. The minimum elements for such report are 
settled under Portuguese law in art. 181º CVM: it must contain a sustained autonomous 
opinion of the type and amount of the consideration offered, of the bidder’s strategic 
plans for the company, of the impact of the bid - in the target company, generally, and 
on the interests of its employees, on its working conditions and on the places at which 
the company has business activity, in particular – and of the intentions of the members 
of the board who hold shares in the target company regarding the offer
72
. All the above-
mentioned information should be clear, complete, up-to-date, truthful, objective and 
lawful
73
. The board is required to issue and send the report to the potential acquirer and 
the CMVM, as well as publicly disclose it
74
.  Other collaboration duties are applicable 
to the behaviour of the members of the board during the course of a bid under art. 181º, 
nº 5 of CVM
75
. 
Besides this report, the management can also exercise its influence on the 
shareholders’ decision by lobbying the securities and markets national authority (in 
Portugal, the CMVM) or the government is also available. The board might instead seek 
help from third parties (Killer Bees
76
) in order to make the change of control more 
expensive, namely by celebrating an agreement with the bank of the target in which 
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As an example of such influence, see the Report of the Board of directors of CIMPOR on the 
opportunity and the conditions of the offer by INTERCEMENT (Camargo Corrêa) of April 13 2012.  The 
Board did not recommend to shareholders to sell their shares, concluding that the price offered was low 
and significantly undervalued CIMPOR. Nevertheless, neither did the board recommend shareholders to 
maintain their investment in CIMPOR, as it did not have adequate information on the future of CIMPOR 
post-offer. 
72
 The negative votes issued in the resolution of the board of directors that approved the report should also 
be mentioned. Art. 181º, n.º3 CVM. 
73
 See arts. 7º and 181º, n.º5, d) CVM. The general rules of CVM concerning the disclosure of 
information by stock corporations are also applicable.  
74
 Within eight days of the receipt of the draft public offer announcement and draft prospectus, or within 
five days of the disclosure of an amendment to the offer documents. Art. 181º, n.º1CVM. 
75
Such as the duty of disclosure to the CMVM of any information regarding the transmission of shares by 
the members of the board (held directly or in the terms of art. 20º CVM), the duty to disclose any other 
information required by the CMVM in its supervision, the duty to inform the employees’ representatives 
(or in its absence the employees) of the impact the takeover bid will have on their interests and working 
conditions, of the contents of the offer’s documents and of its report as well as, and the duty to “act in 
good faith, concerning the accuracy of information and honest behaviour”- Translation of VAZ (2011, 8). 
76
 VAZ (2013, 156). 




such bank promises to refuse the transaction by the potential acquirer or increase the 
costs of such transaction (Bankmail
77
). It is important to analyze the motivation 
underlying the adoption of such tactics in order to access whether there was a violation 




IV. CREDITOR TYPOLOGY AND BARGAINING POWER 
The separate legal personality of the company has become a cornerstone of 
company law and entails that companies are independent legal entities distinct from the 
individuals who hold shares in it and manage it.  As a natural consequence of this 
principle, only the company is accountable in the case of default, causing creditors to 
introduce clauses in their contractual arrangements with the company to secure their 
claims. However, not all creditors have the capacity to impose the introduction of such 
provisions. 
Contractual, commercial creditors (that is, strong creditors), namely banks, 
financial institutions, big trading corporations and bondholders
79
 are powerful and able 
to negotiate the appropriate risk compensations with the corporate debtor. The main 
mechanisms used to ensure that the money they lend is repaid are contractual provisions 
(covenants)
80
. The limited liability rule, also applicable to public corporations has, 
therefore, little impact on these creditors.  
In contrast, involuntary creditors – namely tort victims, consumers and tax 
collectors – and some voluntary creditors – workers, small suppliers and small traders - 
lack such bargaining capacity (they are, consequently, weak creditors): this type of 
creditors is “unable to contract around liability or to prepare adjustments to risk-
shifting by negotiating some compensation in advance”
81
 and therefore more exposed to 
the risks caused by shareholders’ opportunistic behaviours. It can be argued that the 
covenants negotiated by strong creditors in indentures or bonds
82
 can benefit all 




 See Recommendation I.6.1 of Código de Governo das Sociedades da CMVM (2010, 22), referred to on 
footnote 40.  
79
 When the company gives lenders bonds to secure its debts such creditors are referred to as 
“bondholders”. See ARMOUR, HERTIG and KANDA (2009, 118). On bond issuing under Portuguese 
law, see CÂMARA (2011, Manual , 134 -139). 
80
 DOMINGUES (2009, 288). This study will focus on certain types of covenants in its Chapter VII. 
81
 ANTUNES (1994, 135). 
82
 The difference between indentures and bonds is that while the former are non-secured loans, the latter 
are loans secured by a mortgage or a pledge. However, the expression “bond” usually refers to both types 
of lending agreements. DOMINGUES (2009, 568, footnote 2368). 




creditors; however, if such provisions are not introduced (which is more likely to 
happen in continental jurisdictions, where covenants are not so frequently used)
83
 
unprotected creditors may stand to lose out more
84
.   
 
V. CORPORATE CREDITORS AND THE TARGET 
COMPANY: RISKS BORNE IN THE EVENT OF A 
TAKEOVER 
 
As a result of the clear demarcation between the corporation, as a legal person, 





 might arise between the shareholders and the 
company’s creditors as contractual parties, as the former might attempt to manipulate 
the company’s limited liability to undertake actions that benefit them at the expense of 
creditors.  
One of the cases where such conflicts are particularly relevant is when 
bondholders face expropriation of their wealth through inappropriate investment 
decisions, adopted by the company after issuing their bonds. Usually such decisions 
only seek to enhance shareholder wealth, without considering the consequences for 
other constituencies and for the company itself. The adoption of riskier strategies has a 
strong potential to reduce the overall value of the firm’s assets and consequently of its 
debt finance, thereby harming creditor interests. According to Smith and Warner, there 
are four major activities that the management (acting in the shareholders’ interest) might 
engage in after the bond issue
87
: transferring assets from the corporate pool and leaving 
the creditors with worthless claims, namely by means of raising the dividend rate (asset 
dilution)
88
; selling assets used in low-risk business activities to pay for the acquisition of 
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 See p. 34. 
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 DOMINGUES (2009, 288, footnote 1100). 
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 FERRAN (2008,19). 
86
The modern version of the agency theory, as set out by ARMOUR, HERTIG and KANDA  (2009, 115 
and ff.), comprises three types of agency problems: between managers and shareholders, between 
majority and minority shareholders and between shareholder and non-shareholders (such as the 
company’s creditors). See also JENSEN and MECKLING (1976, 310). 
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 SMITH and WARNER (1979, 117-118). See also NASH, NETTER, and POULSEN (2003, 203-204). 
88
 Nevertheless, many legal systems establish restrictions to the distribution of dividends, and such legal 
provisions are considered to be part of the creditor protection framework offered by general company 
law, as it is mentioned on p. 33. 




assets to be used in high-risk business activities (asset substitution)
 89
; increasing the 
company’s overall borrowing (debt dilution or claim dilution)
90
; unwillingness to make 
the investments required for growth opportunities when the gains arising from the 
project might also benefit bondholders (underinvestment) 
91
. Directors and managers 
have additional incentives to adopt such strategies when they own significant equity 
stakes (through stock option plans
92
) or when they are accountable to majority 
shareholders.  
When considering the case of a takeover that causes the company’s share value 
to drop, there are no doubts that creditors bear the burden of such depreciation, as their 
claims and bonds will consequently become less valuable. Additionally, creditor’s 
guarantees might be harmed as a result of the new owner’s business decisions
93
 . 
The changes of control operated through Leveraged or Management Buy-Out, 
provide two examples where the newly-owned company may not have the sufficient 
asset base to meet the corporate creditors’ claims. The consequences of such operations 
will usually be that the company is saddled with repayment obligations arising from 
financing the acquisition and, consequently, its existing bonds are downgraded
94
. 
According to John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr., “creditors may find the face value of 
their claims suddenly deflated by the target’s having taken on a heavy debt burden to 
finance the acquisition or subsequent restructuring”
95
.  
                                                          
89
 ARMOUR, HERTIG and KANDA (2009, 116). In the case of asset substitution, there will be a change 
in the company’s risk profile. Shareholders can benefit from an increase in the riskiness of the firm’s 
business, by receiving more dividends if the value of future cash flows increases. On the other hand, if 
such value decreases, shareholders will not be harmed, as they cannot lose more than the value of their 
shares (as a consequence of the company’s limited liability). Creditors, on the other hand, have fixed 
claims against the company, which means that even if more profit is generated, they will not receive more 
than what was contractually stipulated. And, of course, the riskier the company’s profile, the greater the 
chance it will not generate sufficient cash flow to pay them. The company needn’t even to default on its 
obligations for the interests of creditors to be harmed: the increase of the riskiness in the debtor’s business 
activity will imply a decrease on the value of the creditors’ claims in secondary loan markets.  
90
 ARMOUR, HERTIG and KANDA (2009, 117). The more creditors a company has, the lower will the 
expected recoveries for such creditors be should the firm default. The new borrowing will be subsidized 
by the existing lenders.  
91
 See ARMOUR, HERTIG and KANDA (2009, 117, footnote 7). 
92
 However, if the blocks of shares owned by directors are poorly diversified, they will be more adverse to 
risk-taking. 
93
 The potential acquirer’s intentions with regard to the future business of the target company must be 
disclosed in the offer document, in the terms of art. 6º, n.º3, i) of the Takeover Bids Directive. 
94
 An example of a complex Leveraged Buyout which resulted in a downgrade of the bondholders’ bonds 
was the case NJR Nabisco. See OSÓRIO (2011, 33, footnote 13). 
95
ARMOUR and. SKEEL (2007, 1739).  




A Leveraged Buyout (LBO) occurs when the target company’s assets are used as 
collateral to purchase the company itself
96
. The financial sponsor will partially finance 
the acquisition with borrowed capital (usually bank debt), secured by the company’s 
assets or its capacity to generate future cash flows
97
. Consequently, the purchase costs 
will be transferred to the company itself. The ratio of the company’s debt to its equity is 
called leverage ratio
 98
, and the higher the leverage, the higher the returns will be for the 
financial sponsor, thereby creating an incentive to employ as much debt as possible to 
finance the acquisition. As a consequence, the surviving entity will be privately held
99
 
and highly leveraged (a shell corporation
100
), and if it does not generate sufficient profit 
to service the debt there is a high risk of insolvency. A particular type of leveraged 
acquisition is the Management Buyout (MBO), when the incumbent management 
acquires all or a sizeable portion of the company’s shares by means of a merger with a 
newly formed company created by them. The funding is provided by debt or securities, 




To protect themselves against such risks, creditors use a range of covenants 
when celebrating bond or loan agreements (in addition to the basic obligations to repay 
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 BRATTON (2006, 55). 
99
 See the distinction made on footnote 6. 
100
 BRATTON (2006, 55). 
101
 Some financing instruments used are bonds (art. 348 and ff. of CSC), convertible bonds (art. 365 and 
ff. of the CSC), no-voting stocks (art. 341 and ff. of CSC) and secured bank loans (such as mortgage 
loans). Some techniques which can be adopted consist on the issue of shares and warrants, the sale 
leaseback and the use of equity investment funds and of employee stock option plans. See OSÓRIO 
(2011, 99-114). 
102
 See point 3 of Chapter VII. 




VI. THE INTERESTS OF CREDITORS IN THE LIGHT OF 
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES DURING A TAKEOVER 
 
When the board of directors advises the shareholders on a takeover bid or adopts 
certain strategies and defensive measures to frustrate a takeover attempt
103
, their actions 
must be seen in the light of the general fiduciary duties (“deveres fiduciários gerais”)
104
 
established under art. 64º CSC 
105
. Such duties constitute a central aspect of corporate 
governance
106
 and are equally binding for the management of public corporations. This 
legal provision establishes a series of obligations owed primarily by members of 
the board of directors to the corporation that employs them, and outlines two general 
fiduciary duties: a duty of care (“dever de cuidado”), on the one hand, and a duty of 
loyalty (“dever de lealdade”), on the other. The duty of care entails that a director must 
use ordinary care and prudence while operating the company’s business. The standard 
of conduct used to access whether a director or manager can be held liable for violating 
this duty is the business judgment rule
107
. This United States case law-derived concept 
contains a legal presumption that the firm’s directors and managers are properly 
informed, that their actions were taken with a bona finde regard for the interests of the 
corporation and that they were based on rational criteria from a corporate / economic 
standpoint
108
. The duty of loyalty encompasses that corporate directors or managers of a 
company must put the company's interests ahead of their own
109
. 
If corporate directors breach one of the general duties, they will be liable 
towards the company for not pursuing its interests (being that such claim can also be 
filed by the company’s creditors- art. 78º CSC)
110
. For this reason, it is important to 
access whether the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires the board to take into account the 
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 Such strategies and measures are described in points 2 and 3 of Chapter III. 
104
 VAZ (2013,131). 
105
 Art. 64º, n.º1, a) refers to the duty of care and skill and art. 64º, n.º1, b) refers to the duty of loyalty. 
This is the text arising from the reform brought by Decree-Law n.º76-A/2006, of 29.03.06, in which there 
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WATSON (1993, 91).  
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 See Principle VI.A. of the OECDE Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, 24).  
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 FRADA (2007, 3). 
108
 See ABREU (2012, 19), ABREU and RAMOS (2004, 13), SILVA (1997, 515- 516) and 
VASCONCELOS (2009, 11-32). 
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 See NUNES (2001, 89). There is a breach of this duty when directors divert corporate assets, 
opportunities, or information for personal gain. See ABREU (2012, 136-139). 
110
Also, according to ESTACA (2003, 182) and ANTUNES (2009, 36-37), the violation of the company’s 
interests by the directors can be accepted as a just cause of removal. See Art. 403º, n.º1 of CSC. 




creditors’ interests during a takeover attempt and whether such duty is breached if 
directors do not exercise their influence to frustrate a bid which they believe to cause a 
substantial damage to those interests
111
.  
Such questions take us to the important debate on what interests should be 
considered by the board while managing the company. Under Portuguese law, the 
debate on which interests are included in the “interest of the company” is centred in the 
text of art. 64º, nº1, b) of CSC
112
, which states that directors and auditors must “pursue 
the company’s interest taking into account the long term interests of the shareholders, 







1. The Takeover Bids Directive 
Looking at Article 3º, nº1, c) of the Takeover Bids Directive, the same debate 
arises, as there is an obligation for the board of a target company to “act in the interest 
of the company as a whole”, but there is no pan-European consensus on the concept of 
“interest of the company”
115
. Also, the same provision seems to call for a 
proportionality test between the board’s obligations to act in the best interest of the 
company taken as a whole, on the one hand, and to provide the holders of the securities 
the opportunity to decide on the merits of a bid, on the other hand. The balance between 
the company interest rule and the adoption of the board neutrality rule (in Art. 9º of the 
Directive) by the MS renders the practical effect of the former unclear, as there is no 
provision regarding how the conflicts between the interests of stockholders and 
stakeholders might be resolved. Is the practical effect of the Directive that the board is 
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Examples of such situations were given on the previous chapter. 
112
 Other provisions from the CSC refer to the company interest, such as arts. 6º, n.º3, 251º, 328º, n.º2,c), 
329º, 2, 400º, n.º1, b) and 460, n.º2. See ABREU (1996, 226). This study shall only analyze art. 64º, n.º1, 
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lealdade, no interesse da sociedade, atendendo aos interesses de longo prazo dos sócios e ponderando os 
interesses dos outros sujeitos relevantes para a sustentabilidade da sociedade, tais como os seus 
trabalhadores, clientes e credores”. In the Spanish Ley de Sociedades Anónimas, modified by Ley 
26/2003, of 17.07., art 127- bis establishes that directors must perform their duties in the pursue of the 
social interest. Such interest is merely defined as the ”interest of the company”, which also caused 
Spanish authors to discuss which interests should be taken into account by corporate directors during a 
takeover. Daniel Ruiz de Villa argues that the interpretation of art. 3º, c) of the Takeover Bids Directive 
and of the Introduction of Ley del Mercado de Valores, of 24.07.88, allow for a wider conception of the 
interest of the company. See RUIZ DE VILLA (2010, 31-33). 
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 The original version only mentioned the interests of shareholders and employees. A reform was 
operated by D.L.n.º 76-A/2006, of 29.03.06. A similar evolution took place in the U.K. jurisdiction, with 
the introduction of section 172 (1) of the 2006 Companies Act. See footnote 127.  
115
 SJÅFJELL (2010, 8). 




entitled to take into account a broader range of interests beyond the shareholders’ 
interests when advising on a bid, but is not bound to do so?   
One could argue that the term was deliberately left vague as a political 
compromise, allowing each MS to interpret it within its own tradition: some authors 
suggest that the limits of what the board is allowed to do in order to comply with art. 3º, 
nº1, c) without jeopardizing the neutrality principle are to be settled by national laws
116
. 
It is also impossible to overlook the barriers to a complete harmonisation of takeover 
regulation within the EU
117
, as the “flexible framework”
118
 that the Directive introduces 




Nevertheless, an autonomous interpretation within the context of the Directive is 
required
120
, which is why we agree with the perspective that envisions the term in a 
wider sense, going beyond the interests of the shareholders as a class and allowing 
broader stakeholder interests - such as creditors’ rights – to be taken into 
account
121
.Whatever the target company’s shareholding structure is, agency problems 
always arise between the potential acquirer and non-shareholders, especially creditors 
and employees. There is a legal obligation to take into account the interests of such 
constituencies, which gives rise to directly enforceable rights under art. 17º of the 
Directive
122
 - and not just the possibility of considering such interests. 
In the next point, some perspectives of which interests should be included in the 
concept of “interest of the company” in the event of a takeover shall be described.  
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2. The shareholder primacy view  and the enlightened shareholder 
value 
Under a contratualist approach, the definition of company interest would be 
restricted to “the interest of the shareholders as a class that the firm maximizes its value 
and consequently is able to distribute dividends”
123
. This position is also referred to as 
the “shareholder primacy view”
124
 and prevailed in the Anglo-American corporate law 
systems (or shareholder-oriented models), due to the more advanced state of the market 
for corporate control in such jurisdictions
125
. An evolution of this perspective called 
enlightened shareholder value is adopted in the UK
126
. Following the enlightened 
shareholder value approach, corporations should pursue shareholder wealth with a long-
run orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based on “striking a balance”
 
127
 between the competing interests of the different stakeholders. The board’s ultimate 
responsibility is to the shareholders as a class but it is required to pursue that objective 
with regard to long-term consequences, employee interests, relations with suppliers, 
customers and others, impact in the community and environment and the company’s 
ethical reputation. In the context of a takeover, however, shareholder interests seem to 
come to the forefront, which leads to a shorter-term focus on current share-price and to 
the restriction of the powers of the board
128
.  
The Portuguese literature traditionally adopted this position
129
, only considering 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies if they are aligned with the interests of 
the shareholders
130
. For such authors, the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, 
such as employees and creditors, and the personal interests of shareholders – as 
mentioned in art. 64º, nº1, b) – should be taken into account as mere limitations to the 
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directors’ duty to pursue the company’s interest in maximizing its value
131
. It could also 
be argued
132
 that in order to pursue the objective of maximizing the firm’s value the 
board will necessarily take decisions that aim at maintaining and enhancing the value of 
the company’s assets, which is also beneficial to the corporate creditors
133
. Some 
authors consider this rationale also applicable in the event of a takeover attempt: when 
the individual interests of the shareholders and the interest of the company as a whole 
and of other constituencies are not aligned, the former shall prevail, as it is the owners 
of the company that should be protected primarily and they will have the final decision 




3. The institutional view  
In contrast to the contratualist view, the institutional theory encompasses that 
the need for the firm to be efficient determines that its interests do not correspond to the 
interests of the shareholders as a class. This view considers that companies play a 
fundamental social role of helping the development of a community’s Economy.  The 
company is seen as a separate economic agent (theory of Unternehmen an sich
135
), with 
interests which go beyond the direct interests of the shareholders. The interests of the 
company represent the common interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, 
suppliers and customers. Some European countries adopt this company-oriented 
approach
136
. This position is also adopted among Portuguese literature
137
. 
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4. The stakeholder model 
Finally, there is a growing acceptance towards the idea that “acting in the 
interests of the company” requires that the interests of all affected constituencies are 
valid in their own right, rather than as a means of achieving shareholder value. The 
same logic is applicable when discussing the company’s environmental 
responsibility
138
. The interests that should guide the management are not only the 
interests of the shareholders as a class, but also the interests of other constituencies, 
such as employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and of local communities and 
authorities which can be affected by the company’s sustainability– the stakeholders. 
According to the European Commission
139
, a stakeholder is “an individual, community 
or organisation that affects, or is affected by, the operations of a company”. 
Stakeholders can be internal (e.g. employees or shareholders) or external (e.g. 
customers, suppliers, creditors and the local community)
140
. This pluralistic view is also 
referred to as “stakeholder model”
141
, and is adopted in some jurisdictions in to 
determine the directors’ general fiduciary duties
142
. In Portugal, the authors who adopt 




 requires the 
board to strike a balance between the different interests of the constituencies
144
.  
The stakeholder view holds that taking into account the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies will benefit the shareholders on the long-run: the firm’s 
global value is likely to increase if its contractual relationships with those individuals 
are maintained and if new relationships are established. This formulation does not 
mean, however, that directors should only pursue the interests of stakeholders, or that 
such interests shall prevail over the interests of shareholder on the long-run: the primary 
goal of the board should be, at all times, maximizing the firm’s wealth.  But managing 
                                                          
138
 According to EIJBOUTS (2011, 35, 49-50), the normative version of the stakeholder theory is based 
on ethical perspectives. 
139
 See the European Commission’s Green Paper - Promoting a European framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility (2001, 25).  
140
 Other types of stakeholder classification can be adopted, namely the one used by SERRA (2011, 213-
214), between contractual- shareholders, employees, business partners, suppliers, customers and creditors 
- and collective stakeholders – the local community, organisations, national authorities or the government.  
141
 NUNES (2012, 441 and ff.) and RIBEIRO (2012, 509 and ff.). 
142
 See s. 93(1) AktG for Germany.The regulation of defensive measures is consequently more relaxed 
than in the UK. See The Takeover Directive Assessment Report (2012, 64). See GERNER-BEUERLE, 
PAECH and SCHUSTER (2013, 68). 
143
 Operated in 2006- See footnote 105. 
144
 See FRADA (2007, 217), CUNHA (2010, 41, 570 and ff.).See also Livro Branco Sobre Corporate 
Governance em Portugal (2006, 141-142).  




the company calls for a proportionality test, and directors should avoid that the 
decisions which aim at pursuing the long-term interests of the shareholders cause an 
unreasonable sacrifice to other constituencies. 
145
.   
 
5. Critical analysis 
Bearing in mind the considerations made above, we believe the stakeholder view 
to be the correct perspective to adopt in the discussion of which interests should guide 
the board of directors while managing the company. In fact, if the board only seeks to 
maximize shareholder wealth while managing the company, it will adopt riskier 
investment strategies
146
 without considering the consequences on other constituencies. 
Such actions can have negative consequences in the company’s assets and consequently 
on its financial situation, thereby affecting creditors. 
In the particular context of a takeover, this problem becomes even more 
relevant: as it was demonstrated in Chapter V, corporate restructuring, especially when 
operated through LBO or MBO, can lead to the depreciation in the target company’s 
share value, causing creditors’ claims and bonds to become less valuable. Therefore, it 
is important to access which interests should be considered by the directors when a bid 
has been announced and whether they are required to take into account the effects of the 
takeover in the creditors’ positions.  
The vague reference made in art. 3º, nº1, c) of the Takeover Bids Directive to the 
“interest of the company as whole” has compromised a harmonised understanding 
leading to different interpretations of the term and to similar formulations at national 
level (such as art. 64º, nº1, b) of the CSC). But as soon as one realizes that a takeover 
constitutes one of the most important decisions for the company’s business, one 
concludes that interests other than the ones form the shareholders should be taken into 
account, such as the interests of the company’s creditors.  
With this guideline mind, we reach finally the thesis defended in the present 
study. The risks borne by corporate creditors in the event of a takeover, together with 
the fact that they are important financers to the company, justifies a stronger protection 
of their position during the course of a bid. Naturally, such protection must comply with 
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the board neutrality rule established at EU-level
147
. In other words, although directors’ 
powers during a takeover process are limited, they will still be bound to the core duty of 
loyalty, which requires them to act with the interest of the company in mind, which 
includes the interests of its creditors.  
Moreover, this duty grants the board more discretion when facing a bid, 
allowing it to exercise its influence
148
 to thwart a takeover that is considered harmful for 
the company’s creditors - as long as the consideration of such interests does not put the 
company’s sustainability at stake. We consider that the board must take into account the 
interests of stakeholders during a takeover process, when it predicts that without a 
decision favouring those interests they would be substantially harmed and without a 
corresponding benefit to the shareholders. If directors do not exercise their influence to 
deter a takeover which will most likely affect the company’s financial situation and the 
position of the company’ creditors, legal standing can be exercised on the basis of arts. 
17º of the Takeover Bids Directive
 
and 78º of the CSC
149
. 
The consideration of other interests by the management is one of the reasons for 
admitting the use of defensive measures by the board in the constituency statues 
adopted by some U.S. States
150
. In Europe, a reference should be made to the Belgian 
legal system, where it was understood that the board of directors should assess the 
merits of the bid in the light of the interests not only of the shareholders but of all 
stakeholders
151
. Nevertheless, an enlightened shareholder approach of the duties of 
corporate directors during a takeover still prevails in Portuguese and international 
literature, which is why the next chapter will focus on additional legal and contractual 
solutions that grant creditors some protection.  
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VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
 
1. General legal provisions 
The Portuguese CSC, CVM and Code of Insolvency of 2004
152
 contain 
provisions regarding the protection of creditors which are applicable to all parties who 
contract with companies and that aim at assisting their transactions.  
Some examples of rules which grant some legal protection to creditors are rules 
on the formation and maintenance of companies’ equity capital (namely, minimum 
capital standards, rules on distributions of dividends and on the serious loss of the 
subscribed capital
153
),the provisions establishing corporate directors’ civil liability 
towards the company or vis-à-vis the company’s creditors (art. 72º, 78º and 79º CSC
154
), 
the duty for the directors to file for insolvency of the company when its financial 
situation requires them to do so, along with the criminal liability if they do not comply 
with this legal obligation (art. 19º and 189º CIRE)
155
,  and disclosure mandatory 
requirements
156
 concerning significant direct (and indirect- art. 20º CVM) holdings of 
the company (“participações qualificadas”)
157
, the prospectus which precedes a 
takeover bid launched over the company
158
, and inside information
159
. Issuers are also 
subject to ongoing disclosure obligations
160
. 
Although these solutions benefit all creditors, they not grant as much protection 
as contractual remedies, as we shall analyse on the next point. 
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2. Reasons for creditors to rely on contracts  
Traditionally, there was a difference between the protection of creditor interests 
in Continental and in Common Law jurisdictions: while the Common Law tradition 
relied more on contractual clauses, in Continental countries the main protection was 
offered by general company law provisions. Such differences are beginning to fade 
away as the preference towards contracts increases among Continental jurisdictions. 
The causes of such preference are the greater sensitivity of contracts to the firm’s 
specific business model, the heterogeneity of creditor interests - which does not advise 
the use of standard-form terms - and the ease of renegotiation of the clauses should the 
circumstances change over time.  
The ability of creditors to negotiate such clauses depends, however, on the 
number and identity of creditors
161
: it is harder for a large number of bondholders to 
renegotiate contractual provisions than for a few banks- which is why bond covenants 
are usually fewer and weaker than covenants in lending agreements
162
; also, strong and 
weak creditors occupy different positions in relation to the corporate debtor, and only 
the former are able to negotiate the clauses in their lending agreements
163
. 
 According to the costly contracting hypothesis
164
 , strong creditors – namely 
banks and financing institutions – anticipate the risks of default of the corporate debtor 
by introducing certain types of contractual clauses (covenants) in their indentures and 
bonds. The aim of such covenants is to restrict the firm’s ability to divert or substitute 
assets, which is why they will only work as protection mechanisms if the creditor has 
the power to negotiate their introduction in the agreement celebrated. Such contractual 
provisions grant creditors a certain amount of control over the corporate debtor’s 
activities. Covenants can increase the firm’s value at the time bonds are issued or that 
the debt contracts are celebrated, but they also impose costs on the issuing firm, 
especially the loss of flexibility when deciding on its investment and financing 
opportunities.  
Such clauses reflect the specific needs of the contracting parties
165
, which is why 
the issuer compares the benefits and costs of each clause
166
 and selects the ones that add 
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the most value to the firm. The company’s financing needs usually determine its 
contracting choices, and for a company to agree to such clauses the loan provided by the 
counterparty must be crucial for its business activity. However, such remedies are only 
effective to protect strong creditors, who might refuse to grant the loan or demand 
higher interest rates if the debt contracts do not include such clauses
167
. 
Besides contractual clauses, issuers may choose to take security interests in 
corporate assets (which will require the firm to obtain the consent of the creditor before 





3. Contracting around takeovers 
Literature outlines two broad categories of covenants
169
: the ones that restrict 
dividend and financing activities (such as limits on payment of dividends and other 
distributions, and limits on the issuance of additional debt) and the ones that restrict 
restructuring or investment decisions (namely merger restrictions, change of control 
provisions and limits on sales). Nash, Netter and Poulsen argue that merger restrictions, 
change of control provisions and limits on sales are primarily driven by the issuing 
firm’s risk of financial distress, rather than by its investment opportunities
170
. To 
preserve flexibility, firms closer to insolvency are thought to be less likely to include 
such restrictive covenants, although they will usually not be able to negotiate the 
conditions of their financing contracts.  
We shall focus on the covenants included in bond issues and lending agreements 
to protect creditors against changes of control in a company’s structure. Some examples 
are event-risk
171
 covenants in bond issues - which protect creditors against risks of 
claim dilution resulting from a LBO or MBO
172
-, change of control provisions and 
merger covenants conditioning the merger to the survivor’s ability to borrow under the 
debt contract ex post the closing of the merger. One should bear in mind, however, that 
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3.1. Change of control provisions 
Change of control provisions (or poison puts) are contractual provisions which 
give a party to the agreement the right to terminate the contract (or to demand a higher 
interest rate)
174
 in the event of a change of control of the other party. Such clauses are 
included in financing contracts, employee contracts, as well as in intellectual property 
rights transfer agreements
175
. In financing agreements, the creditor is given enhanced 
protection, as it will enable him to demand the repayment of the principal amount of the 
loan with interest or to cancel any obligation to grant future loans in the event of a 
takeover. Thus, poison puts are seen as acceleration clauses
176
, as debt becomes due and 
payable upon their violation.  
The condition that triggers the poison put is the change of control, which might 
be determined according to a majority criteria (the acquisition or holding, directly or 
indirectly, by another company or by an individual , of more than fifty percent of the 
voting share capital of the company or the ability to appoint or dismiss all or the 
majority of the members of the board of directors or of other supervisory body
177
 ), or 
according to the mandatory bids requirements (the acquisition or holding of a number of 
voting rights that trigger the obligation to launch a mandatory takeover bid)
178
. In some 
contracts the events mentioned above must be accompanied by a downgrade on the 
company’s debt for the contract to be lawfully terminated
179
. As far as formal 
requirements are concerned
180
, art.  245º-A, nº1, j) CVM establishes that change of 
control provisions must be disclosed by the company
181
. Under Belgian law, for such 
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clauses to be lawful they will have to be approved by the general meeting, besides of 
being disclosed by the company
182
. Without such approval, these provisions will 
resemble poison pills: if the company has to return its loans if acquired, its amount of 
debt might dissuade a potential takeover bid 
183
.  
The inclusion of such clauses in bond contracts or in a lending agreement grants 
the lender (usually the company’s bank) a significant degree of control over the 
company: they protect his interest that the ownership and control of the company 
remain substantially unmodified and allow him to terminate the financing agreement if 
it doesn’t. According to Dubout
184
, by introducing such provision the creditor 
artificially introduces a personal feature in the commercial contract celebrated with the 
company
185
, reducing the effects of the idea of separate legal personality of the 
company: there is an exception to the principle that obligations of the corporation do not 
disappear should the board be replaced.  
 
3.2. Merger restrictions 
Some covenants contain flat prohibitions on mergers, while others only specify 
conditions for such activities
186
. Restrictions on mergers mitigate creditor expropriation 
by asset substitution, as they provide obstacles to the management’s attempt to 
undertake riskier projects after issuing their bonds.
187
 A typical merger restriction 
covenant is the clause in a loan agreement that states that if the debtor is subject to a 
merger it must immediately return the principal amount. The Portuguese law refers to 
such clause in art. 101º-B, nº 3 CVM. 
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3.3. Agreements celebrated with controlling shareholders  
Shareholders agreements (“acordos parassociais” art. 17º of CSC)
 188
 are 
agreements regarding the ownership and voting rights of the shares in the company 
which can be celebrated between shareholders. Some authors consider that such 





 might celebrate this type of agreements with the majority shareholder or 
with the controlling block of the company they financed, thus exercising some influence 
in that company’s defence strategy: one of the clauses which might be included is the 
one establishing an obligation to the company’s blockholder to use its majority holding 
to approve the adoption of a pre-bid defence in the general meeting or to establish such 
measure in the company’s articles of association
191
; in the case of  post-bid defences, 
the majority vote must be exercised in the general meeting held for the purpose of 
authorising the board to adopt the defensive measure. Creditors might be able to 
exercise some influence in thwarting an unwanted takeover by imposing to the 
shareholders the approval of some defensive tactics
192





VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main purpose of the present dissertation has been to analyze the possibility 
of considering the interests of corporate creditors when their interests are affected as a 
result of a takeover. After making some considerations regarding the role of takeovers 
and of the market for the corporate control, we analysed the legal rules which guide the 
management’s actions during the process of a takeover and described some situations 
where the position of corporate creditors might be affected by a change of control. We 
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attempted to prove that creditors should be protected in the event of a takeover and to 
provide some contractual remedies which can be used.  
As a consequence of the adoption of a board neutrality rule by the Portuguese 
legislator, the managing board has a merely advisory role during a takeover process, 
although it can exercise a significant influence on the shareholders’ decision through the 
report it elaborates on the conditions, opportunity and merits of the bid and through the 
adoption of other tactics referred to in this study. Some authors argue that a broader 
discretion should be given to corporate directors in such circumstances, arguing that if 
the decision on whether to accept or reject the bid is allocated to the shareholders, they 
will most likely sell their shares if the offer is wealth-enhancing. But the change of 
control itself might cause the share-value to drop, and consequently the depreciation of 
creditors’ claims and bonds. On the other hand, the fact that the price offered maximizes 
shareholder wealth on the short-run does not necessarily mean it constitutes the best 
choice for the company and for its creditors in the long-run, especially if the bidder’s 
intentions with regard to the future business of the company includes the adoption of 
riskier strategies. 
The Takeover Bids Directive’s vague reference to the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies in such cases makes it difficult to reach a consensus on 
whether there is a legal obligation for corporate directors to exercise its influence to 
frustrate the bid when they believe it to be beneficial for shareholders but prejudicial for 
the company’s creditors. In the context of Portuguese company law, a pluralistic 
interpretation of art. 64º, nº1, b) CSC leads us to accept that the general fiduciary duty 
of loyalty towards the company that also bounds directors during a takeover implies the 
consideration of the effects of the takeover on the creditors’ claims and rights. 
Nevertheless, most national and international authors adopt an enlightened shareholder 
approach of the interests of the company during the process of a takeover, which is why 
it is also important to identify some additional contractual remedies which creditors can 
use to thwart a takeover attempt.  
Two examples can illustrate that covenants can grant strong creditors a certain 
degree of control over the company. Lenders might include change of control provisions 
in their financing agreements as conditions for celebrating such contracts. Furthermore, 
by means of an agreement with the majority shareholders of the company creditors are 
able to approve in a general meeting the adoption of defensive measures to protect the 
company. Bearing in mind the different positions occupied by strong and weak creditors 




in relation to the corporate debtor, there are no doubts that the latter face more risks and 
are not able to negotiate their defences.  
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